We introduce a new solution concept for 2-person bargaining problems, which can be considered as the dual of the Equal-Area solution (EA) (see Anbarcı and Bigelow (1994) ). Hence, we call it the Dual EqualArea solution (DEA). We show that the point selected by the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (see Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) ) lies in between those that are selected by EA and DEA. We formulate an axiomarea-based fairness -and offer three characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in which this axiom plays a central role.
Introduction
In a bargaining problem two players need to agree on a utility allocation from a feasible set of allocations, S ⊂ R 2 + . Failure to reach an agreement leads to a status quo utility of zero for each player. A bargaining solution describes how the players solve every conceivable bargaining problem; formally, a solution is a function that chooses a unique point from every such S. One basic requirement on a bargaining solution is fairness, in the sense that whenever more options become feasible, no one should get hurt. Since a bargaining problem is an infinite object, there are many ways of defining how ''more options become feasible''. [4] proposed the following fairness requirement, which is based on the area of S: if the area of S increases, no one should get hurt. Moreover, they showed that there is a unique solution (equal-area solution) which satisfies this property (area monotonicity) and strong Pareto optimality on the domain of convex problems. The equal-area solution assigns to each S the point on its frontier, x, such that the line segment between the origin and x splits S into two parts of equal areas. Informally, the equal-area solution can be considered as an application of the egalitarian principle on an area measure of concessions. [2, 5] , and [3] provided noncooperative and dynamic foundations for the equal-area solution.
We introduce a new concept into the bargaining literatureduality -and apply it to the equal-area solution. The resulting solution is the dual equal-area solution. This solution applies the egalitarian principle on an area measure of aspirations. We formulate a requirement -area-based fairness -which stipulates that when these two solutions propose the same point, then this point should be chosen as the solution point. We derive three characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (see [9] ) on the basis of area-based fairness and some standard axioms.
Section 2 describes the bargaining model. Section 3 introduces duality. Section 4 introduces area-based fairness. The characterization results are in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The bargaining model: definitions
The following is a simple version of the bargaining model in [10] . A bargaining problem is a compact and comprehensive set S ⊂ R the status quo can be abandoned in a way that makes both agents better off (relative to the status quo). The assumption that S is comprehensive -namely, that x ∈ S ⇒ y ∈ S for every y that satisfies 0 ≤ y ≤ x -means that utilities can be freely disposed (down to the status quo levels). Given a problem S, the ideal point
is called agent i's ideal payoff. The collection of problems is denoted
Given a function ψ:
every problem S and every pair of positive linear transformations,
independence has first been introduced by [10] (under the name independence of irrelevant alternatives). Restricted contraction independence, introduced by [12] , narrows the scope of the axiom: it imposes the requirement of contraction independence only on pairs of problems, {S, T }, that in addition to the condition of contraction independence share the same ideal point. Another axiom that we will use and that also imposes a restriction on nested problems with a common ideal point is restricted monotonicity (introduced by [13] 
Duality
Given a problem S with S ̸ = comp{a(S)}, we define the dual problem of S as D(S) ≡ comp{a(S)} \ S.
At an informal level, one can think of the following story as underlining a bargaining problem: the agents ''start'' at the origin, and they need to move forward, towards the frontier, and reach an agreed-upon point. Then, the informal story corresponding to the dual problem is that the agents ''start'' at the ideal point and they need to concede to move towards the frontier and reach a feasible point.
We define the duality transformation, φ S = (φ S,1 , φ S,2 ), by φ S,i (x) ≡ −(x − a i (S)). The transformations φ S,1 and φ S,2 shift the ideal point to the origin and then ''mirror'' the resulting set, carrying it from the south-west quadrant to the north-east one. Note that for every S ∈ B such that S ̸ = comp{a(S)} we have φ S •D(S) ∈ B. More generally, a bargaining domain D is closed under duality
In this paper, we consider two domains: the grand domain B and its subset B co . The former is closed under duality, whereas the latter is not. 
where φ
−1
S,i is the inverse of φ S,i . In words, duality says that applying f to S is same as ''standing at a(S)'' and applying f to D(S).
Requirement (i) makes sure that φ S •D(S) on the RHS of (1) belongs to D. Requirement (ii) guarantees that 0 is the ''ideal point'' of D(S).
The egalitarian solution (see [8] ) and the equal-loss solution (see [6] ) are two solutions that are duals of each other. The former assigns to each S the intersection point of its (weak) Pareto frontier and the 45°-line, whereas the latter assigns to each S the intersection point of its (weak) Pareto frontier and the 45°-line drawn from a(S). On the other hand, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, which is defined by KS(S) ≡ max{λ : λa(S) ∈ S} × a(S) is dual to itself (i.e., Eq. (1) holds with f =f = KS) on the domain of problems with a boundary that does not contain a segment parallel to an axis.
Area-based fairness
The equal-area solution (see [4] ) assigns to each S the point of its Pareto frontier, x, such that the segment conv{0, x} splits S into two subsets of equal areas (see Fig. 1 ). In this paper, we introduce the dual of this solution, which we call the dual equal-area solution. For each S, this solution assigns the Pareto efficient x such that conv{x, a(S)} splits D(S) into two subsets of equal areas (see Fig. 1 ). We denote the equal-area solution and its dual by EA and DEA, respectively.
As we mentioned in the Introduction, for convex S, EA is the only strongly Pareto optimal solution satisfying the requirement that no one loses when the area of S increases. Analogously, DEA satisfies the following property: when the area of S decreases and the ideal point is unchanged, no one benefits. DEA satisfies some standard axioms such as Pareto optimality, symmetry, and scale covariance.
EA and DEA demonstrate that there are at least two ways to define egalitarianism on the basis of areas: the original way of [4] and the dual way of DEA introduced here. We seek to merge them into a single fairness criterion. We believe that any reasonable merging would adhere to the following requirement: Definition 1. A solution f satisfies area-based fairness if for each S the following holds:
That is, in those cases where the two solutions agree, the areabased fairness property requires this agreed-upon point to be the solution-point.
Characterizations
The following results use the fact that DEA satisfies scale covariance (Lemma 1) and KS i (S) is sandwiched between EA i (S) and DEA i (S) for every S ∈ B and i = 1, 2 (Lemma 2). The statements and proofs of these lemmas are in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. A solution on B satisfies area-based fairness and restricted contraction independence if and only if it is the KalaiSmorodinsky solution.
Proof. Clearly, KS satisfies both axioms (see Lemma 2 for areabased fairness). Conversely, let f be a solution that satisfies them.
Further, let S ∈ B and let x = KS(S). We will prove that f (S) = x.
Under scale covariance, restricted contraction independence can be replaced by restricted monotonicity.
Theorem 2. A solution on B satisfies area-based fairness, restricted monotonicity, and scale covariance if and only if it is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
Proof. Clearly, KS satisfies all axioms. Conversely, let f be a solution that satisfies them and let S ∈ B. We will prove that f (S) = KS(S). By scale covariance, we can assume that a(S) = (1, 1). Let T ≡ π • S, where π is the non-identity permutation; i.e.,
Since V is symmetric with respect to the 45°-line, area-based fairness implies that f (V ) = KS(V ) =
KS(S). By restricted monotonicity, f (S) = KS(S).
We do not know whether scale covariance can be dispensed with in Theorem 2. Nevertheless, Theorem 3 shows that, on the restricted domain of convex problems, it can be dispensed with. Proof. By Lemma 2, KS satisfies area-based fairness, and it clearly satisfies restricted monotonicity. Conversely, let f satisfy both axioms; and let S be a convex problem. We will prove that f (S)
. Therefore, by area-based fairness, f (V ) = KS(S) and by restricted monotonicity, f (S) = KS(S).
Closing comments
The central solution in the bargaining literature is the Nash solution (see [10] ), which assigns to each convex S the maximizer of x 1 · x 2 over x ∈ S. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, in contrast to Nash solution, is well-defined also on the domain of nonconvex problems. There is a small literature that considers its characterization on this domain. We contribute to this literature, which includes [1, 7, 11] , and [14] .
Our paper also reveals the non-trivial fact that the KalaiSmorodinsky solution can be founded on the basis of area-related notions, a fact that can be viewed as a conceptual link between this solution and the Nash solution. An alternative area-related notion of duality between these solutions, one that has been recognized by [4] , is as follows: the Nash solution selects the maximal point on the diagonal of the maximal-area rectangle that is contained in the bargaining problem, and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution selects the maximal point on the diagonal of the minimal-area rectangle that contains the bargaining problem. This inequality implies four possibilities concerning the location of z on the frontier of S. Before analyzing these four cases, first note that if y is on the 45-degree line (i.e., y = x), then because all weak inequalities above are satisfied as equalities, it follows that z = x: so, we are done. Therefore, below we consider situations where y is above the 45-degree line. 
